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Abstract 
The object of this qualitative study was to use Leavitt’s (1965) socio-technical change model and the 
Punctuated Socio-technical Information systems Change (PSIC) model proposed by Lyytinen and 
Newman (2008) as twin approaches to illustrate three closely related large Information Systems (IS) 
projects called Tango I, Tango II and Tango III that were implemented and developed by two 
consortia of several public user organisations during a 10 years period to replace a variety of legacy 
systems. The study demonstrates how the management of the implementation process and interactions 
between the work process and build process shaped the different kinds of outcomes. This study 
demonstrates the utility of a pictorial depiction of a complex project. Findings from the case study are 
analysed using the punctuated process model and implications for academics and project managers 
are discussed. 
 
Keywords: Socio-technical system; social process; punctuated equilibrium; information system 
development; success and failure; change management; inter-organisational public sector systems; 
organisational collaboration in public sector IS development 
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1 Introduction 
It has long been recognized that large information systems (IS) implementations in organizations may 
have high risks (Markus and Tanis 2000). New complex business processes require massive re-
configuration efforts of both software and work procedures (Poston and Grabski 2001). In contrast, 
well-implemented IS projects can result in significant cost reductions, improved management 
reporting and control, and increases in efficiency by offering timely access to accurate information 
(Markus and Tanis 2000). IS development (ISD) has long been seen as a socio-technical change 
process (e.g. Kwon and Zmud 1987; Leavitt 1965, Newman and Robey 1992). The process model 
presented by Newman and Robey (1992) is frequently cited to describe the events in the process itself 
and relate those events to outcomes. Lyytinen and Newman (2008) argue that studying the whole 
project implementation process can help researchers to get a richer picture. The punctuated 
equilibrium model has been seen as a very good theoretical framework to explain organisational 
change (Newman and Zhao, 2008; Newman and Robey, 1992; Lyytinen and Newman, 2008). 
In this study, Leavitt‟s (1965) socio-technical change model is used to identify the relationships 
between structure, actors, technology, and task and their effects on IS implementation. We also show 
how the Punctuated Socio-Technical Information System Change (PSIC) model (Newman and Zhao, 
2008; Lyytinen and Newman, 2008) can depict a complex, critical longitudinal series of events in a 
concise format and how the PSIC model deepens our understanding of ISD research and practice. The 
parallel processes are exhibited by the building events and the work (or legacy) events in addition to 
focusing on points of interaction. A critical event that occurs during the project (i.e. in the building 
system) produces a gap between, say, the task and the technology. Clearly, not all events are critical 
but we designate an event as critical if it produces a gap in the socio-technical entities. We also 
include the elements of context (organisational and beyond) which may interact with the build and 
work processes as these may also be sources of critical incidents. Sometimes the gap becomes visible 
after a longer period of time after the critical event. We call these gaps emergent. 
Our research question is: How can a combination of a socio-technical change model and PSIC model 
be used to illustrate the social dynamics of ISD in three collaborative public sector IS projects? 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a summary of the relevant literature 
to this study. The third section outlines the research methodology. The fourth section describes a focus 
of this research, three consecutive IS projects that were implemented by two consortia. The fifth 
section describes our findings. The sixth section discusses our findings, and the future research 
possibilities. We conclude our study with a brief summary of our contributions and suggestions which 
may be helpful to scholars in IS research as well as practitioners involved in similar IS projects. 
2 Literature review 
The relevant literature for this paper describes and explains the PSIC model (Newman and Robey, 
1992; Robey and Newman, 1996; Newman and Zhao, 2008; Lyytinen and Newman, 2008). Newman 
and Robey (1992) claimed that ISD can be „conceived as a sequence of episodes, punctuated by 
encounters, that follows patterns established in previous development work‟. The aim of the process 
models is to focus primarily on social change activities. The very important focus is on sequences of 
critical incidents that link antecedent conditions with outcomes within contexts (basic process model) 
(Newman and Zhao, 2008; Lyytinen and Newman, 2008). Lyytinen and Newman (2008) argue that 
there will be occasions or gaps where changes will make the actors restudy and change assumptions 
about how work is accomplished or systems are built. A new project may involve many different 
punctuations, first in the build system when the project is established, and later in the work system if 
and when the new information system replaces the legacy system. The punctuation model (Figure 1) 
shows a successful punctuation at the start of a new project and a change in the deep structure.  
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Figure 1.  The Contextual Punctuated Process Model (showing a successful punctuation. 
Adapted from Newman and Zhao, 2008; Lyytinen and Newman, 2008)  
Newman and Zhao (2008), Pan et al. (2006) and Lyytinen and Newman (2008) introduced the 
parallel process model using the socio-technical entity concept (Figure 1). By using the model it is 
possible to examine the organisational work process, the IS building process and their interactions 
with the environment simultaneously. Changes in existing organisational routines or/and work 
processes can become critical incidents which in turn will affect the project implementation process. 
The parallel process model considers that the build and work processes exist and interact with each 
other in parallel until the end of the project life cycle when the legacy system is replaced with the new 
one or the new system is abandoned. There are two types of socio-technical configurations, one 
associated with the build process and another with work or legacy process. For example, task is 
defined in two ways: one is the task of building the information system while the other is defined by 
the existing work practices. In summary, shaped by an historical context (antecedent conditions), 
existing socio-technical arrangements continue until a critical incident (planned or, usually, 
unplanned) takes place which produces a gap between one or more of the socio-technical (S-T) pairs. 
This is an unstable state and actors, when they recognise the problem, may attempt to design 
interventions which may remove the gap successfully or may fail and even result in multiple gaps (i.e. 
unintended consequences). In contrast, some interventions (planned or unplanned) may produce 
punctuations (or second order changes) that produce a new deep structure. Assembling the building 
team and delivering the final system to replace the existing work processes are both examples of 
common punctuations but there may be also internal or external sources, for example a decision to 
outsource development work or the project manager leaving the project. 
3 Methodology 
This study is a qualitative and interpretive case study. Klein and Myers (1999: 73) claim that the 
relationships between people, organisation(s) and technology are constantly changing, and as a 
consequence, interpretive researchers are trying to make sense of a moving target. Our data consist of 
archived folders gathered over the years as the first and fourth authors‟ personal project 
documentation, notes, contracts, memos of meetings and e-mail messages. With the aim to understand 
organisational background, past IS conditions, current initiatives, future vision, and the driving forces, 
documentation analysis and observations were added to the research data. Data Analysis: In step one, 
the data are used to produce a basic narrative of the overall process, the storyline: what happened; 
when did it happen; what went before; what were the outcomes; and what were the influences? During 
this first analytical step, the antecedent conditions for the project implementation were also identified. 
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From the storyline, it was possible to identify the essentials of the development process (Figure 2). In 
the second step, we looked for critical incidents, separating them into work and IS building events for 
our first project that conditioned two later ones (see next section). We also looked for interactions 
between the processes. For step three, we used the punctuated equilibrium model to analyze these 
critical incidents. Essentially, the model depicts project (i.e. build activities) and work life as relatively 
stable (evolutionary) periods punctuated by shorter, turbulent periods which are capable of influencing 
the project‟s trajectory. The critical incidents are associated with these revolutionary periods. 
Fourthly, we interpreted the data to draw the individual socio-technical diagrams, identifying the four 
components and any gaps between them. The authors grouped those identified events into the four 
categories according to Leavitt‟s model (1965), namely, task, actors, technology, and structure. 
Subsequently, gaps (e.g. Lyytinen and Newman, 2008) between the four components were identified. 
In the fifth step, we analyzed organizational contexts for their interactions with the processes. Finally, 
for the sixth step, combining data from steps one to five, we constructed the overall process diagram 
(see Figure 3). With the identified events and phases in relation to the IS project, the sequential 
patterns are arranged in chronological order via many iterations between the steps. These results were 
used in the analysis of the transition from the second project to the third. 
4 The research site and background 
Table 1 presents three collaborative IS projects
i
 which followed each other. Figure 2 presents the main 
events, problems and strategies of the projects in order to help reader to understand the findings.  
 
The IS projects, and 
organisations involved 
The main phases of the projects. In 1995 when TANGO I began, there was no nation-
wide IS for the application area. Therefore each organisation had its own IS. 
TANGO I (1995-2004): 
Specification, design & 
implementation project 
with testing, adoption and 
maintenance phases. 
Organisations: 
Originally five public 
sector user organisations 
(Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, 
Echo, Golf; 13 
organisations in 2004), 
feasibility study consultant 
(Sammy), two software 
vendors (Victor and 
Yankee) 
The most important reasons for cooperation of five public sector user organisations in 
1995 were expense cuts both in the development of IS and in maintenance, the lack of skilled 
staff, dependence on a single or few individuals, the needs to reform old systems especially 
in view of Y2K, and cuts to general public funding of the organisations. The idea of 
developing a joint system received support from the management of organisations, and so 
Juliett consortium was formed in 1995. More organizations joined to the consortium, 
totalling 13 in 2004. The first newcomer was Zulu in 1997; Zulu had a very problematic 
implementation process starting in late 1999. 
Victor and Yankee were selected in the spring of 1996. Victor had experiences about the 
same kinds of implementations and Yankee had more experience on architectural issues. 
Yankee was the main vendor and Victor was its subcontractor. Specification phase: (1995-
1996), design phase: (1997-1998), implementation phase: (Feb 1998 ->), Testing phase: (Feb 
1999->), The joint maintenance phase: (1999-2000). Use and further development (2000-
2004). More than 3000 software changes or corrections have been made to the system during 
the years 1999-2004.   
TANGO II (2002-2003): 
Specification, interface 
pilot and planning project 
for an IS to support client 
mobility. 
Organisations: 
Ministry, Romeo, 
Juliett, Yankee, Oscar, 
Quebec, Alpha 
Ministry funded the project via Juliett and Romeo (consortium of 20 public sector 
organisations, founded in 2000).  Romeo and Juliett operated in closely related areas. Juliett 
suggested to Ministry that they could do cooperation with Romeo in TANGO II. Juliett had a 
very poor financial situation and the cooperation between Romeo and Juliett would help 
Romeo as well. All Juliett members were also members of Romeo. Oscar and Yankee: 
Suppliers of the software. Quebec: Expert consultants. Alpha: User Organization. Because 
of problems in TANGO I and II, Romeo, Juliett,Yankee and Oscar were not included in 
TANGO III. 
TANGO III (2004-2006): 
The aim of the project was 
to carry out a pilot test 
before establishing the 
TANGO II mobility IS at 
the national level. 
Organisations: Alpha, 
Bravo, Golf, Delta, Echo, 
Sierra, Quebec, Ministry 
Alpha, Bravo, Golf: User organizations. Ministry gave a funding for the project via Alpha. 
Delta: User organization with different legacy IS, a part of the project because Ministry 
suggested it. Romeo had a representative in the TANGO III project group and steering 
group, but as a consortium it was not a project actor. Echo: a project management 
organisation, in charge of the project, also having a strong interest to do research work. 
Sierra and Quebec: It was the aim that these suppliers will implement the project. They 
won the bidding competition. Sierra  supplied the software solutions for the project. Quebec 
acted as an expert (finished collaboration before the project was over). 
Table 1. Three consecutive information system projects. 
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Figure 2. Events, problems and main strategies during three ISD projects.  
5 Findings 
This section contains our selection of the important events and periods, as well as their brief 
description. Through our selection we show how the gaps between the S-T pairs evolved over the 
      Putting Echo to be responsible,   
          including research aspects   
  
2003/11       How to secure safe   Bidding competition   
      and smooth software   for TANGO III opened   
      purchase   
  
2004/3   Vendor   choice for       Emphasis on the capability of the   
  TANGO III confirmed       vendor to deliver a functional   
          system in spite of the client‟s   
          poor  capability to define its needs   
2004/4   Non - problematic TANGO III   
onwards   progress from the organisers  
point of view 
‟ 
   
     
  
Time   Event or     Problem     Action strategy   
Year/Month   issue   
  
1995       Outdated   systems   Establishing Juliett consortium    
        in several public   for cooperative IS development   
      organisations    within TANGO I project 
  
  
1997       Scarcity of monetary   Enrolling more members to   
      resources   i n Juliett   Juliett consortium   
  
  
1999       Increased project   
      coordination efforts    
  
  
2000   Problematic  Juliett   Frustration in many   Loan taking for more   
  software adoptions     Juliett organisations   rapid Juliett development   
  
  
2001 /4   First successful   
  Juliett adoption   
  
  
2001/6   Juliett  personnel and   Scarcity of monetary   Incorporating Romeo services into   
  Ministry meeting,   resources continue in Juliett   Juliett   
  Juliett and Romeo cooperation   
  considered suitable   
  
2001/7 - 12   Bidding competition       Vendor (re)selection for control    
        reasons   
  
  
2 002/1   Juliett and Romeo meetings       Juliett vendors are chosen   
  
  
2002/4   TANGO II started       Juliett vendors are hired for TANGO II   
  
  
2003/4   Idea of  TANGO III      Project management   
  is developing     problems in TANGO II,   
      real and anticipated   
      Juliett consortium    
reorgan isation issue emerging   
2003/5   TANGO II stopped   
  
  
2003/6   TANGO III organised 
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years. Below, W means work system and B means build system. We use the PSIC model in order to 
uncover the background and reasons from TANGO I for the organisational changes observed in the 
transition from TANGO II to TANGO III. Essentially several major actors were changed: software 
vendors were replaced with new ones, the two consortia were replaced with four user organisations, 
and the project leadership and management were obtained from Echo; the previous project manager 
was from Romeo. Our PSIC analysis of TANGO I reveals the problems that conditioned the change 
from TANGO II to TANGO III, in addition to the problems of TANGO II. Obviously the 
reorganisation was successful, because the progress of TANGO III was considered smooth and 
successful by its key participants. W1: The preceding period: the times before joint system 
development (before December 1995). The members of Juliett consortium were using their own 
systems, mostly developed within their own organisations. In the various meetings between the 
organisations‟ IS staff, discussion also arose on the development of a joint system. New gap: task vs. 
technology in the work system. In common with many legacy systems the old systems were 
inadequate for the tasks. 
B1: The first Juliett consortium agreement was signed in December 1995. The signing of the first 
consortium agreement marked the start of official cooperation and a feasibility study for the system 
and also provided the framework for the kind of system cooperation that had never existed between 
these public sector user organisations. B2: Design phase (April 1997 – January 1998). In the planning 
phase general satisfaction with the joint understanding reached by the project group was preserved. In 
the design phase some user groups took part in the activities of the project group, but most of the 
responsibility remained with the project group. Documentation was distributed to be commented 
inside the organisations, but they did not open up very well to anyone for whom systems development 
was a mystery. For many end users the object-modelling description method used in the 
documentation was strange and it was therefore difficult for them to comment on things. New gap: 
task vs. actors, because the documentation was not read carefully enough by user representatives. 
B3: Zulu joined the consortium in December 1997. From the viewpoint of the consortium, the decision 
of Zulu to join turned out to be significant for all the parties. Zulu did not have a preconception of 
whether the forthcoming system would meet their requirements. On the other hand, the Juliett 
Consortium could not gauge whether the joining of a new member would cause new demands on the 
system. The differing requirements of the newcomer only later became apparent to the representatives 
of the Juliett Consortium. Prevailing gap: task vs. actors, because the documentation was not read 
carefully enough by user representatives. Emerging
ii
 gap: task vs. structure arose because Zulu was 
not prepared adequately for the demands of the Juliett project. 
B4: Implementation and testing phase (February 1998 – November 1999).The implementation phase 
was launched with optimism. It was intended that issues left open in specification and design would be 
complemented in the implementation phase. This was what the project group had agreed, but the 
implementation was carried out on the basis of deficient documentation. The customer waited for 
questions on issues needing clarification, while the supplier coded according to the documents making 
conclusions at its own discretion. At this time the consortium only had one project manager, whose 
tasks include the construction of cases for testing the system. But he did not have enough time to do 
this, and finally the cases were requested from the supplier. Not even the supplier could accomplish 
this with a sufficient coverage. Thus there were problems in testing. Prevailing gap: task vs. actors, 
because the documentation was not read carefully enough by user representatives. New gap: task vs. 
structure: not enough resources to make the test materials. Emerging gap: task vs. structure, because 
Zulu was not prepared enough for the demands of the Juliett project. B5: First Juliett software version 
delivered (August 1999). The vendor was alone without customer participation to implement the 
system on the basis of excessively abstract specifications. The customer was waiting for requests for 
clarification that were never made. As a result, the system had both technical problems and functional 
problems. Resolved gap: task vs. actors, because the documentation was not read carefully enough by 
user representatives; now the users see the system that is being tested. New gap: task vs. actors: 
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excessive amount of faults in software. Emerging gap: task vs. structure, because Zulu was not 
prepared enough for the demands of the Juliett project. 
W2: Inauguration of the system at Zulu (Oct – Dec 1999). The software was poorly tested. Moreover, 
Zulu had not had enough time to get acquainted with the system they were introducing. The 
differences in the processes only became fully apparent at the inauguration. Major problems arose, and 
an effort was made to solve them with the so-called Zulu plan. Changes in the Zulu staff also made 
inauguration and above all data conversion difficult. Partly resolved gap: task vs. technology in the 
(old) work system: now the new Juliett was in use in Alpha and Zulu. New gap: task vs. structure, 
because Zulu was not prepared enough for the demands of the Juliett project. New gap: task vs. 
technology: the web–application was not functional because of software tool problems. 
B6: Maintenance and corrections (February 2000 onwards). The system had to be brought to a 
reasonable condition as the first inaugurations had already been performed. Alpha coped with the 
problem by slightly increasing its resources, but the situation at Zulu was grave. The focus there was 
on correction of software faults and the improvement of functionality. The report programs were re-
implemented under warranty, but other changes resulted in a lot of expenses. The Zulu situation was 
coming to under control via a special Zulu plan. Prevailing gap: task vs. actors: faults in software. 
Prevailing gap: task vs. structure: still too few developers and not enough money for rapid software 
development. Resolved gap: The web–tool is changed to a workable one. B7: Taking out a loan 
(Spring 2000). The trust of the leading officers at Alpha in the Juliett system could be seen concretely 
in the situation in which the managing director of Alpha granted a loan to the Juliett Consortium. 
Without this loan, the financial situation of the Juliett Consortium would not have allowed rapid 
improvement of the functionality of the system, and the situation of the system would have remained 
in a worse state for a much longer time. If the loan had not been granted/taken, the consequent slower 
improvement of functionality would also have tested the patience of the management of the other 
organisations. It is likely that there would also have been delays in the joining-in of new members, and 
the support given by the Ministry would not have been equally good. The new members also might 
have made a different decision in their own information system projects for study administration in 
that situation. In 2000-2002 the expenses clearly exceeded annual income. Prevailing gap: task vs. 
actors: faults in software. Resolved gap: task vs. structure: because of the loan, there was now enough 
money for software development for the short term, and resources could be increased. New gap: 
actors vs. structure: some Juliett steering group members (and their colleagues in respective 
organisations) did not approve the loan; they thought that work should be covered by the normal 
monetary frame. Other actors considered that future maintenance fees would cover the loan, and there 
should be no interruption in software development. 
W3: Inauguration at Bravo (Spring 2001). The successful inauguration of the whole system at Bravo 
on April 2001 was psychologically significant especially for the Juliett project group, the management 
group and the consortium administration. The inauguration of the system only one week behind the 
schedule added to the general trust in the Juliett system. Resolved gap: task vs. technology in the (old) 
work system: now the new Juliett was in use in Alpha, Zulu and Bravo. Old systems could indeed be 
replaced by Juliett system. Resolved gap: task vs. structure: although Zulu was not originally prepared 
enough for what the Juliett project would demand, the progress there and the successful inauguration 
process at Bravo resolved this gap between task and structure. Resolved gap: task vs. technology: the 
non-functional web–application was replaced. 
B8: Attempts at reorganisation (Spring 2003). Some of the organisations‟ IT managers thought that the 
work under the old Juliett organisation was exceptionally problematic. The discussions revealed 
radically different ideas about both system development and the organisational model needed for its 
coordination and the model of management. There were proposals that the consortium‟s operations 
should be incorporated into a company and a special institute should be founded. Most of the decision-
makers thought, however, that it was most cost-efficient to arrange the operation of the Juliett 
consortium personnel as part of Alpha‟s activities through contractual arrangements. Prevailing gap: 
actors vs. structure caused by controversy about the loan. Emerging gap: actors vs. actors and some 
Proceedings of the 21st European Conference on Information Systems
7
actors vs. structure: Re-organisation. B9: Repayment of the loan (Summer 2003). Repayment of the 
loan to the Alpha showed that the financial situation had reached a balance and that there were no 
extraordinary financial burdens any longer. The belief and trust in terms of both the organisations‟ 
management and the Ministry had troubled many of the members of the management group. Now they 
could once again focus on the development of the system and how to organise cooperation. Resolved 
gap: actors vs. structure: controversy about the loan was over, because the loan was paid back. New 
gap: actors vs. structure: Re-organisation. B10: Reorganization, addition to personnel resources and 
further development (Autumn 2004). The first full-time project director was hired for the period from 
September 1, 2004 to July 31, 2007. The first author (the former Juliett director
iii
) applied for the job, 
but was replaced by a new person. Two new project managers were hired starting January 1, 2005. 
The annual capacity of the consortium administration was 4.6 man-years, which was significantly 
higher than before. Resolved gap: actors vs. actors and some actors vs. structure: Re-organisation was 
now in effect. Emerging, but still invisible gap: actors vs. structure: the Juliett consortium changes 
introduced a new configuration that seemed unstable and led personnel turn-over. 
General Case Interpretation: Figure 3 is a pictorial summary of the TANGO I project trajectory 
using the PSIC model. The project is seen as a punctuated equilibrium process, where critical incidents 
emerged at different levels, i.e. in both organisational and external contexts, affecting the stability of 
the building process. The building process is presented as a sequence of socio-technical entities 
(represented by diamond shapes) and gaps (shown as thicker arrows) that may appear between the four 
components following the occurrence of critical events. The organisational work process is depicted in 
a similar way. The mutual influences between these two parallel processes are also shown on the 
diagram, presented as thick black vertical arrows. These vertical arrows between the diamond shapes 
on the parallel processes demonstrate the significant points at which the two parallel processes 
intersected. Critical incidents generated gaps in the socio-technical components at the organisational 
work level process, which in turn resulted in gaps on the project level process.  
The  rows „External context issues‟, „Organisational context issues‟ and „Build level issues‟ represent 
the critical incidents. The external context includes issues that are beyond the organisational boundary 
of the work and build areas. Organisational context takes account of planned or unplanned events that 
had significant impacts on the project implementation and also managerial decisions in relation to the 
implementation. Build management issues are issues that take place within or outside the project 
affecting the implementation process, such as a project team re-structuring. It is clear that the two 
parallel processes had significant influences over each other.  
Our over-all interpretation of Juliett development history is that there existed four deep structures in 
the process from 1995 to 2005. The first deep structure was the optimistic development during the 
years 1995-1999. The punctuation generating this deep structure was the establishment of Juliett 
consortium and the TANGO I project. The second deep structure, the emergence of the development 
crisis, was punctuated or made visible through the delivery of the first versions of the software for 
testing in spring 1999. The third deep structure was the development crisis resolution, punctuated by 
the loan taking in spring 2000 and ending in several successful Juliett adoptions in 2003. After that, 
the elements of the work process were in balance and no gap could be seen between them. The last 
successful adoptions in 2005 were a further confirmation of the balance. The fourth deep structure was 
reorganisation, punctuated via the meetings for reorganisation in spring 2003 and ending in Juliett 
consortium‟s personnel changes in 2004 and 2005. The fifth deep structure would have been Juliett‟s 
development with new consortium personnel from 2005 onwards, but that era was beyond our 
research. Altogether, problems in TANGO I conditioned the change between TANGO II and III: the 
TANGO III organisation was made as simple as possible by reducing the number of actors to a 
minimum.
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Figure 3. General Structure of the TANGO I Project Trajectory  
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6 Discussion: Lessons Learned  
Returning to our research question: “How can a combination of a socio-technical change model and 
PSIC model be used to illustrate the social dynamics of ISD in three collaborative public sector IS 
projects?” we can now examine what the contributions of our study are for research and practice. By 
careful use of our documents and observations, we found that we were able to illustrate and explain a 
specific project effectively even though the organisational setting was a very complex one. We 
showed how the TANGO I project arose (the antecedent conditions) and how the major events shaped 
the process and led to the outcome with Juliett software and organising TANGO III.  
Research contributions: Firstly we can comment on the proliferation of factor studies in IS research. 
Given the surfeit of factor studies, we need to balance these with further process studies such as the 
current one (Orlikowski, 1992; Robey and Newman, 1996). While factor studies are able to find out 
the relationships between independent and dependent factors, they essentially treat the process as 
unknown and indeed unknowable (e.g. Kanter and Walsh, 2004). They are normally studies without 
history and context (Carmel and Becker, 1995; Hargrave and Johnson, 2003; Tiwana and Keil, 2006). 
They frequently involve mail shots or web surveys where many subjects are sampled from one or 
many organisations. These studies elicit subjects‟ opinions on dependent and independent factors or 
variables loosely based on hypotheses derived from the literature. In contrast, process studies, while 
targeting just one or a few cases, focus on the major events, their timing and sequence in order to 
describe and explain how history, process and outcomes are linked. 
Secondly, we demonstrate the advantage of separating build and work processes. Often, the work (or 
legacy) system will provide the origin of the project, as in our case. For example, gaps in the old 
systems at Juliett between the task and the technology motivated the organisations to begin the project. 
Moreover, there will be times when intense interactions occur between the project team and the legacy 
system involving the users. The punctuated process model enables us to detail these processes and 
their interactions revealing the twists and turns of the project and showing how the outcome is linked 
to these. Thirdly, our process study is able to provide insights into the patterning effects of success and 
failure. By this we mean the historical patterns that develop and that are reinforced by repetition (c.f. 
Robey and Newman, 1996). That is why it is vital that the historical context of the project is revealed. 
At Juliett there was reported to be a relatively mixed history of systems development and legacy 
systems. In other situations the opposite can occur and an organisation can enter a cycle of failure and 
rejection by the user community which without any decisive action to break the pattern would most 
likely be repeated in any new project (e.g. Robey and Newman, 1996).   
Fourthly, our study also provides insights in understanding the complexity of success and failure in 
ISD and concepts such as escalation and de-escalation (e.g. Keil and Robey, 1999; Drummond, 2005). 
By linking history, process and context we can trace the trajectory of a project and show how the 
process is uniquely related to the outcome and how the various stakeholders can variously capture the 
rhetoric of success. For example, in a previous case (Newman and Robey, 1992), the project was 
delivered five years late and four times over budget but was still believed by the managers to be a 
success. This and other examples indicate that escalation or the commitment of resources to a failing 
project and the demand to de-escalate such systems, appear to be simplistic from a process 
perspective. In the case of Juliett, the system was essential to the partner organisations and to abandon 
it prematurely would have created untold problems. The time overruns might be escalating but they 
still needed the system, i.e. there was no escalation or de-escalation in the demand for the system: they 
could not abandon it. The Juliett development crisis resolution showed that the Juliett community was 
after all committed to finalizing the system. Fifthly, we could give more of a “flesh and blood” type 
analysis of how the struggle between some IT managers and the (old) consortium personnel 
conditioned the flow of events of later stages, and how the problem of different world-views was 
eventually resolved, and what new tensions this resolution brought about. Finally for the research 
community, we acknowledge that case studies of this nature are highly labour intensive. However, 
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other researchers should consider following a similar research paradigm as there is a clear dearth of 
such studies. Such studies will derive rich data sets and theoretical understandings. 
Practitioner Contributions: Firstly, the IS manager is, as in this case, often the boundary-spanner 
between management and the technical community and should be comfortable in both worlds. But 
ISD projects can throw up major sources of stress and Juliett was no exception. For example, the IS 
manager, i.e. the first author as the Juliett consortium personnel director, was involved in choosing the 
software tool but the case revealed there were continuing nagging problems resulting from this choice. 
The process perspective enables us to see how early decisions can cause an escalation of problems 
later which require many “band aids” or work arounds. This does not mean that the IS manager had 
alternatives in this case but it seems wise to invest time and resources in these crucial early decisions. 
While this is hardly surprising it does point to the importance of first moves in a project and the path 
dependent nature of ISD. This is an issue that could be addressed in greater depth in subsequent 
process studies. Secondly, project leaders also need a facility with users and developers. In the course 
of managing the project there will be effects within their control and other, external effects arising 
from context and beyond their control. So both reactive and proactive stances are desirable and this 
was noted in our case. Apart from issues arising from the project‟s context, the process perspective 
also reveals the possibility of creating change through initiating critical events (Newman and Robey, 
1992). Finally, from a senior manager‟s perspective, the project‟s budget and length is, unsurprisingly, 
often underestimated. In our case, the monetary issues could be resolved, because Alpha was willing 
to give temporary funding when it was urgently needed, and new members joined the Juliett 
consortium and brought finances in the form of joining and maintenance fees. The penalty with new 
members was that the coordination of the cooperation of the larger collection of user organisations 
became more difficult. This difficulty was avoided when TANGO III was organised: instead of two 
large consortia of TANGO II, there were four user organisations piloting the system that would later 
be adopted by all Romeo organisations, and Ministry funded the project via Alpha. 
We can push the analysis further and recognise the importance of antecedent conditions. It is pointless 
beginning a large IS project if the organisation has a habit of IS failure. Negative patterns need to be 
broken. These poor patterns need to be acknowledged and managed. Like sports teams, companies 
have “form” (Newman et al., 2008). In sporting, this is with regards to winning games, but in our 
examples we are interested in achieving successful ISD. And like sports teams they often reproduce 
historical behaviour. In the case of Juliett, the history of ISD and use in different organisations was 
mixed. The over-all picture of the administrative IS projects in Alpha was rather positive: only one 
major failure was reported out of thirty projects, and even this failure turned out to be a success. But 
while success is difficult to maintain we know it is all-too-easy to throw away with one or two major 
failures until an organisation drifts into a pattern of failure (Lyytinen and Robey, 1999). 
7 Conclusion 
This research followed Lyytinen and Newman‟s (2008), Newman and Zhao‟s (2008) and Pan et al. 
(2006)‟s approach that has shown that through the use of a case study in the Juliett consortium, critical 
events that occurred along the project process can affect the stability (i.e. equilibrium) of the project 
process. The process itself in the case of Juliett was identified as a sequence of events where the 
connections between a preceding event and its consequences were depicted. Each of these events was 
analysed by the interplay among its four components, i.e. actors, structure, technology, and task, and 
gaps were identified among the components in the case of critical incidents. The interactions between 
the organisational work process and build process were also analysed. While it does not solve the 
success/failure conundrum, our analysis offers a deeper understanding and enables us to comment on 
theories such as escalation and de-escalation (Keil and Robey, 1999) and the many factor or cross-
sectional studies reported in the literature. Our analysis also links TANGO I, II and III projects as a 
continuum.  However, in our case both TANGO I and TANGO III were eventually successful, 
although the process contained deep crises and considerable changes in project personnel. 
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i
 We use fictitious pseudonyms for organisations and projects for confidentiality reasons. 
ii
 We denote emerging gaps with dotted arrows. 
iii
 In 2001 the first author moved to work in Echo, continuing until summer 2004 as a part time director of Juliett 
via a contract between Alpha and Echo. 
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